Move check of public key type against allowed algorithms to before
parsing of the key sent by the peer.
This removes at least some key parsing and verification paths from
the pre-auth attack surface.
Suggested by Christopher Paul Rohlf of Anthropic, ok deraadt@
Update to samba-4.24.5
Security release addressing CTDB protocol bounds checking issues
(CVE-2026-58224). AD and DNS/KDC vulnerabilities do not affect standard
OpenBSD builds. Details:
https://www.samba.org/samba/history/samba-4.24.5.html
Tested by Ian McWilliam (maintainer).
Update to samba-4.24.5
Security release addressing CTDB protocol bounds checking issues
(CVE-2026-58224). AD and DNS/KDC vulnerabilities do not affect standard
OpenBSD builds. Details:
https://www.samba.org/samba/history/samba-4.24.5.html
Tested by Ian McWilliam (maintainer).
vmd(8): restrict qcow2 cluster shifts at parse time.
Qcow2 minimum is 9 (512 bytes). Cap a maximum at 21 (2 MiB).
Report and diff by Andrew Griffiths.
ok hshoexer@
vmd(8): reject short qcow2 l2 metadata reads.
Prevents use of partially initialized buffer if the read is short.
Report and diff by Andrew Griffiths.
ok hshoexer@