drm/amd: Create a device link between APU display and XHCI devices
From Mario Limonciello
b030fde644501d0ed5e604fc01719d1daa9cd472 in linux-6.18.y/6.18.58
75c8746b9d0a0317d8a58aa0efa2ff2f7359908b in mainline linux
update to wine 11.20. Tested by Andrii and me.
dlls/ntdll/unix/file.c has undergone a refactor upstream; we may need
to fix a few things upon further review, but things run well enough to
not delay this update.
Reminder for users to look at README. Expect to be called out for not
having read it when reporting about 32-bit software not running.
This is still early days for the port, so not all 64-bit software runs.
Prioritise previously confirmed certification paths
Duplicate SKI might appear because of reuse of a keypair (a poor CA
practise, but not illegal) or because of 'public key stealing', i.e.,
an adversarial CA issues a certificate containing the victim CA's SPKI
and SIA. Because SKI might not be globally unique, certificates have
been tracked by an internal identifier since 2024.
Jacobsen et al., 2026, reported that rpki-client's certification path
loop protection might be exploited if an adversary can race the victim.
This race can happen in the discovery of the logical certification
topology, unrelated to racing repository loading over the network. Any
payload carrying objects (ROAs, ASPAs, etc) discovered through the
adversary's certification path will fail resource containment checks and
the loop guard (entity_process()->filepath_add()) necessarily enforces
each object to be accessed only once. The result is that if the race is
lost, the victim's payloads disappear from view.
Some people incorrectly assert that RPKI resource certificates cannot
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remove abandonded security/gringotts
This is an abandonded "secure" notes manager in GTK+2 on live support.
setuid-root just mlockall(2) which doesn't need root on OpenBSD.
pea@ maintainer timeout three years ago
Handle the Emudhra intermediate cert compromise.
See https://emudhra.we-have-a-problem.com/
While likely all of Emudrha will be distrusted soon, currently
a lot of India is using them. 8 intermediates under their CA3
have publicly discoverable keys. the 9 others sign many sites.
For now, remove CA3 from the trust store, thus distrusting all
the intermediates it has signed, then add back the remaining
9 uncompromised intermediates by "promoting" to a root, the
usual intermediate elision technique.
This enables real sites in india using these intermediates
to still work. Assuming Emudhra ends up widely distrusted
soon, we can remove these and the other roots after sites
have had time to get new certificates.
from beck@; OK tb@ sthen@
dbupdate: Be consistent with name in messages.
from dgl@; OK deraadt@
force umask
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Handle the Emudhra intermediate cert compromise.
See https://emudhra.we-have-a-problem.com/
While likely all of Emudrha will be distrusted soon, currently
a lot of India is using them. 8 intermediates under their CA3
have publicly discoverable keys. the 9 others sign many sites.
For now, remove CA3 from the trust store, thus distrusting all
the intermediates it has signed, then add back the remaining
9 uncompromised intermediates by "promoting" to a root, the
usual intermediate elision technique.
This enables real sites in india using these intermediates
to still work. Assuming Emudhra ends up widely distrusted
soon, we can remove these and the other roots after sites
have had time to get new certificates.
from beck@; OK tb@ sthen@
update cert.pem based on newer mozilla ca root store
from sthen@; OK tb@
dbupdate: Be consistent with name in messages.
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devel/rebar3: Update to 3.28.0
Fixes CVE-2026-96596
This release also drops the bundled Certifi package and relies on the
system certificate store instead.